



OF REFUGEES AND RESIGNATION 
Philippe Sands* 
Abstract: Building on topics explored in East West Street: on the Origins of Genocide and 
Crimes against Humanity, this article traces the development and publication of James 
McDonald’s Letter of Resignation of League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
Expanding on events outlined in his book, Sands describes how the letter was published in 
1935 as a political statement in the wake of emerging news about Nazi atrocities against the 
Jews and other minority groups. Drawing analogies between these events and the 
contemporary refugee crisis, he raises questions about the current legal, political and moral 




A.  INTRODUCTION 
‘The victims of the terrorism are being driven to the point where, 
in utter anguish and despair, they may burst the frontiers in 
fresh waves of refugees.’ (James G McDonald, 19351) 
 
Over a million refugees came to Europe last year, the overwhelming majority from Syria 
(41%) and Afghanistan (26%).2 Most arrived by sea, into Greece and Italy.3 The United 
Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) has pointed out that the ‘vast majority’ of migrants and 
refugees trying this perilous journey ‘are in need of international protection.’4 Germany 
received almost half a million asylum applications in 2015, and official reports count arrivals 
in more than a million on that same year in that country.5 EU Asylum claims numbered 
1,321,560 in 2015.6 This – and parallel domestic qualms – has led to the signing and entry 
into force of the EU-Turkey Agreement, which sets up (in broad terms) a migrant exchange 
program between Europe and Turkey, with visa waivers and €3 billion thrown in as incentive 
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1 ‘Letter of Resignation of James G. McDonald: High Commissioner for Refugees (Jewish and Other) Coming 
from Germany addressed to The Secretary General of the League of Nations with an Annex regarding 
Germany’s measures against ‘Non-Aryans, and their effects in creating refugees’ (London, 27 December 1935) 
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<www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911> accessed 10 May 2016. 




for Turkey.7 As the 18 March 2016 Joint Statement of EU Heads of State or Government 
informs, the joint action plan consists of: 
 (i) Return of all irregular migrants entering Greece from Turkey starting 20 March – 
all of it in accordance with international and European Law; and  
(ii) Resettlement by the EU of one ‘vulnerable’ Syrian from Turkey per one Syrian 
who is returned to Turkey from the Greek islands.8  
The statement informs the measures to be ‘temporary and extraordinary’ and ‘in accordance 
with the relevant international standards and in respect of the principle of non-refoulment.’9 
The UN Secretary General has described this as ‘a crisis of solidarity.’10 The gravity 
of the situation in Europe suggests that it might be without precedent. Yet that is not the case. 
In researching my latest book East West Street: on the Origins of Genocide and Crime 
against Humanity I came across an episode within an episode, for which I express my 
gratitude to Professor James Loeffler: the effort of Professor Oscar Janowsky to recruit the 
assistance of Professor Hersch Lauterpacht in preparing the Letter of Resignation of League 
of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees James McDonald, in 1935. The drafting process 
of that letter, and the circumstances in which a proposed Annex setting forth a declaration on 
the rights of individuals was discussed, is helpful in shedding a certain light on the matters 
we face today. In particular, when faced with a political imperative to act, the balancing of 
legal considerations with the desire to minimise causing offence that would exacerbate the 
problem that is being addressed is a recurring tension.  
In 1935, James McDonald reached the point at which he decided to resign, and 
recruited a number of individuals to assist him in drafting a letter of resignation. One issue 
McDonald faced was whether to include an Annex to the letter and if so, whether to make 
reference to certain delicate matters. In general lines, one section of the draft Annex – which 
indeed was published11 – regarded domestic measures adopted by the Nazi government 
against minorities, particularly non-Aryans. But an unpublished section of the draft Annex 
concerned an analysis on the duty of the international community, as a matter of international 
																																																								
7 European Commission, ‘EU-Turkey Agreement: Questions and Answers’ (19 March 2016) 
<europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm> accessed 10 May 2016.  
8  European Council, ‘EU-Turkey Statement’ (18 March 2016) <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/> accessed 10 May 2016. 
9 ibid. 
10 UN Secretary General ’Refugee Crisis about Solidarity, Not Just Numbers, Secretayr-General Says at Event 
on Global Displacement Challenge’ (15 April 2016) SG/SM/17670-REF/1228 
<http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sgsm17670.doc.htm> accessed 10 May 2016. 




law, to act in protection of those minorities12 and exercise the ‘right of humanitarian 
intercession.’13 The fate of the letter and its Annex turned on competing considerations as to a 
balancing between the articulation of legal principles, on the one hand, and deference to 
matters of political risk, on the other.14 
This is the same issue today in relation to the proposed EU-Turkey agreement, with 
some arguing for a strict adherence to the legal principles set forth in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention (and its 1967 Protocol) on the one hand, and recognition of political realities, on 
the other. That balancing is patent in some questions being asked by academics and 
politicians: Who can deny that the disparate effects of the Dublin framework which, were it 
to be fully complied with, would disproportionately burden bailed-out Greece vis-à-vis the 
rest of the EU? Who is oblivious to the fact that this distortion of the EU law principle of 
equitable responsibility is of deep political consequence to the discussion about how to 
comply with refugee law today in Europe? These are but a couple out of a thousand possible 
questions where law and policy inevitably converge. 
Back in 1935, this issue of balancing came to a head by reference to the question of 
whether to add an Annex to McDonald’s letter of resignation. McDonald’s team took advice 
from different sources associated with either the American or British Jewish committees, 
which meant balancing different positions about the state of international law at the time, as 
well as questions of political convenience which were differently perceived on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The parallel with McDonald’s letter of resignation and its drafting process – 
which Oscar Janowsky so vividly portrayed in his unpublished memoirs – might offer some 
help in understanding the process which has led us to the agreement between Europe and 
Turkey. 
And so here we are today again in Berlin, eighty-one years after McDonald’s 
resignation, debating our reaction to persecution, escape and apathy. In words attributed to 




12 Oscar I Janowsky Papers (undated 1900– and 1916–1933) ch 17, 371–72, 74 (on file) (‘Janowsky Papers’). 
13 Oscar I Janowsky and Melvin M Fagen, International Aspects of German Racial Policies (OUP 1937) 3-26. 
14 Janowsky Papers (n 12) 368 ‘There was a good deal of discussion as to whether MacDonald should or should 
not make such a statement: whether the lot of the persecuted ‘non-Aryans’ might be worsened by such a 
statement; whether the Nazi government should be provoked; whether the well-disposed Western powers should 
be troubled with a ‘small matter’ like human or minority rights.’  




B.  JAMES MCDONALD’S LETTER OF RESIGNATION: LESSONS FROM 1935 
In 1933 the League of Nations Council appointed James G. McDonald as High 
Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany,16 an American academic who had taught 
history at the University of Indiana and served as chairman of the Foreign Policy Association 
in the United States.17 His mission was ‘to negotiate and direct the international collaboration 
necessary to solve the economic, financial and social problems of the refugees.’18 McDonald 
resigned before the Council just two years into his mandate.19 The letter of resignation 
became a political project – perhaps the most significant moment of his mandate – serving as 
an indictment not only of Germany’s persecution but also of the silence of other 
governments.20 
James McDonald’s office as High Commissioner was somewhat isolated from the 
League of Nations as its funding depended on ‘philanthropic bodies,’ ie private organisations, 
a fact McDonald would denounce as one of the main causes for failure in his letter of 
resignation.21 In those circumstances the letter was conceived as a political statement – a 
document to shock governments and public opinion. Its content and scope were the source of 
bitter disagreements between Oscar Janowsky and Melvin Fagen – delegates of the American 
Jewish Committee – and their British counterparts, including a number of influential 
intellectuals such as professors Norman Bentwich and Hersch Lauterpacht.22  
Internal differences meant the project started as an American-led effort – Janowsky 
and Fagen determining the scope of the project as ‘a scholarly and forceful memorandum, 
calling attention to the plight of the refugees, the burden Nazi policy imposed on states, and 
the legitimacy of international concern, as evidenced by historical precedents and legal 
precepts.’23 
As published and delivered to the Council of the League of Nations on 27 December 
1935, the letter of resignation was accompanied with an Annex ‘containing an analysis of the 
measures in Germany against ‘Non-Aryans’, and of their effects in creating refugees.’24 It 
denounces the intensification of German action against minorities, describing it as a 
‘persecution [which] threatens the pauperization or exile of hundreds of thousands of 																																																								
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22 Janowsky Papers (n 12) 366. 
23 ibid 372. 




Germans … not only Jews but also the ‘non-Aryan’[,] Christians treated as Jews, and 
Protestants and Catholics who … resist the absolute will of the National Socialist State.’25 
McDonald also highlights the plights of half a million people who were being 
‘crushed’ for not conforming with the ‘Nordic’ idea of man idealised by the regime.26 The 
systemic persecution was described at length in the letter.27 McDonald winds up in a tone 
verging on desperation expressing that ‘[w]hen domestic policies threaten the demoralization 
and exile of hundreds of thousands of human beings, considerations of diplomatic correctness 
must yield to those of common humanity,’ and ‘plead[s] that world opinion, acting through 
the League and its Member States and other countries, move to avert the existing and 
impending tragedies.’28 That effort failed. 
*** 
As stated, one issue that arose was whether to include in a proposed Annex to the letter ‘a 
statement about the rights of religious and racial minorities which would be ‘a part of a ‘Bill 
of Rights’; and also an indictment of Germany for its persecution of non-Aryans, which 
created an increasing, grim problem of refugees.’29 The proposal had apparently come from 
James N. Rosenberg30 – an influential member of the American Jewish Committee, Columbia 
Law graduate and successful lawyer, who later served as delegate of the US Commission for 
the UN Genocide Convention, but is better known today for the artwork he produced after 
retiring.31 
In preparing the Annex MacDonald worked with Oscar Janowsky – at the time only 
3532 and Assistant Professor of History at the New York City College33 – and Melvin Fagen – 
described by Janowsky as ‘a young man in his twenties who had not even completed his 
graduate studies in International Law.’34 Janowsky devoted an entire chapter of his memoir to 
this event – Chapter 17 – which he described as ‘the day-to-day record of the MacDonald 
Letter of Resignation as [he] saw it and experienced it … in 1935 … a reconstruct[tion] from 
memory, good and reliable memory, from MacDonald’s and [Janowsky’s] own diaries, and 																																																								
25 ibid para 2.  
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27 ibid paras 11–14. 
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29 Janowsky Papers (n 12) 363 (citing McDonald’s Diary, 11 June 1935 entry) (on file). 
30 ibid. 
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from much correspondence which [he] preserved.’35 It is from this unpublished document 
that I draw my account. 
Janowsky favoured the proposal until the very end,36 but his view evolved as he came 
to see the difference in approach and perception between the American Jewish community – 
which supported the idea – and the British Jewish community, which did not. Regarding the 
latter, Janowsky came into contact in particular with two men who occupied a significant 
place in his account.37 The first was Professor Norman Bentwich, the ‘Director’ of the High 
Commission for Refugees, who worked closely with McDonald. Janowsky described him as 
‘a scholar of shallow draft and by no means an unsuccessful one’ with a ‘timid, cringing, 
underhanded manner.’38 The second was Hersch Lauterpacht. 
The discussion about the possible implications of Letter and Annex is summed up in 
the following excerpt from Janowsky’s memoir: 
There was a good deal of discussion as to whether MacDonald should or should not 
make such a statement: whether the lot of the persecuted ‘non-Aryans’ might be 
worsened by such a statement; whether the well-disposed Western powers should be 
troubled with a ‘small matter’ like human or minority rights.39 
Bentwich apparently oscillated, but eventually came down against the idea. The entire 
American project was ‘ill-advised.’40 Janowsky and Fagen decided to produce a ‘scholarly 
and forceful memorandum’ that would ‘call attention to the plight of the refugees, the burden 
imposed by Nazi policies on others, and the legitimacy of international concern as evidenced 
by historical … and legal precepts.’41 Janowsky hoped that such a document, coming from 
McDonald, would stimulate public opinion and protest, although he did not believe that 
‘appeals to justice – moral or legal justice – would have any effect on the German 
[g]overnment to moderate its racial policies.’42 Nor did he believe that the League ‘would be 
roused into action.’43 His hope was that the memorandum would counteract ant-Semitic 
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propaganda, deter mass acceptance of such policies, and discourage other governments from 
emulation – it was a ‘plea … to the conscience of humanity.’44 
The American duo researched and worked non-stop from mid-September to the end of 
October, 1935. ‘It was not only a full time job, it absorbed our energy, thoughts and even 
emotions,’45 wrote Janowsky. He completed his chapter on ‘Aryan decrees’ and moved to 
‘Precedents for International Action to Safeguard Human Rights’, working with Fagen on 
building a legal case – himself focusing on historical issues – but always ‘discuss[ing] every 
point and shar[ing] every conclusion.’46 
This must have been a draining and exhausting period for Janowsky. He declared 
himself to be ‘depressed by … [the] lackadaisical and often downright indifferent attitude of 
an appreciable number of academics to the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis,’ particularly 
those of the ‘social-Scientist variety … who saw no reason to condemn Nazi Germany or 
Soviet Russia [because human rights denial was consistent] with a set of principles and 
objectives differing from [those] of democratic societies.’47 He grew exasperated with 
apologetic attitudes wrapped up in scientific-rigour considerations, going as far as to refer to 
a visiting scholar from the University of California, a Professor Steiner, as a ‘nut’ for arguing 
that objectivity demanded abstaining from judgments until the so-called ‘Aryan decrees’ 
were in fact enforced.48 
They left Geneva in late October, and arrived in London on 2 November 1935.49 By 
then McDonald faced a division amongst his supporters: the Americans urged ‘a strong 
indictment of Nazi Germany for the persecution of the Jews,’ whereas the English counselled 
‘caution’. By mid-November Janowsky had won his initial skirmishes, persuading Neville 
Laski to have their memorandum incorporated in full as an Annex to the Resignation Letter.50 
Preliminary conferences showed, at that point, a non-committal Bentwich. On Monday 18 
November, a ‘[f]ull dress conference [was held] at the Chambers of Lionel Cohen [at 
Lincoln’s Inn]’.51 This was the first significant meeting in the critical appraisal process of 
Janowsky and Fagen’s memorandum. Amongst those present was Hersch Lauterpacht. 
Janowsky had mixed feelings about him. He thought him ‘a brilliant man on the rise … and a 																																																								
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bit overbearing; 52  Janowsky showed great respect and deference towards him on the 
professional plane – ‘unquestionably a brilliant authority on International Law [whose] 
contributions to the … Letter were excellent,’ but held similar amounts of personal contempt 
– thinking him a man consistent with the ‘libellous stereotype of the Galitznianer’53 much 
prone to ‘steam-roller tactics.’54 
At this point the rubber hit the road, with a major dispute as to whether the letter 
should also set out to build a legal case on the point of ‘Precedents for International Action to 
Safeguard Human Rights.’ Janowsky thought it was essential to include this part in the 
Annex to the letter;55 another group, led by Hersch Lauterpacht – ‘the voice of authority’ 
Janowsky wrote of him56 – thought that part should be scrapped altogether.57 A case of 
pragmatism prevailing over principle. The issue remained open at the end of the meeting, the 
parties agreeing to resume discussions later. This they did in two different sub-groups, one 
including Janowsky, Fagen, McDonald and Laski; the other composed by the opposition 
camp: Lauterpacht, Bentwich, Idelson, and ‘probably’ Lionel Cohen.58 
Janowsky speculates on the scope of the attack that was being concocted by the 
opposition camp, and thought that not only Fagen’s legal argument was threatened, but also 
his chapters on precedents for international action and his conclusion on League 
intercession.59 His premonition proved accurate: ‘The opposition came [to the] November 
24th [conference] with a complete strategy.’60 The memorandum was divided in two parts: 
Part I concerned domestic policy, mainly the so-called ‘Aryan decrees’, while Part II – ‘more 
than one half of the Memorandum’ – regarded the chapters on ‘Precedents for International 
Action to Safeguard Human Rights’ and the duties of the League of Nations (both authored 
by Janowsky), as well as the legal case against Germany (penned by Fagen).61  
Lauterpacht proposed Part II to be eliminated in its entirety – ‘mutilated’ in the words 
of Janowsky62 – while the latter thought this part, now labelled generically as ‘Precedents,’ 
‘lent powerful support to McDonald’s plea to the Council of the League of Nations for 
intercession on behalf of the refugees … [and are] evidence that … the League would not be 																																																								
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embarking on a new and untried policy.’63 As expressed by Janowsky, ‘[him and Fagen] put 
up quite a fight’ and discussions ‘became a little ‘ardent’ and testy.’64  
At this point Janowsky’s exasperation muted into plain contempt for Lauterpacht and 
Bentwich. He felt he was not being given reasons why ‘[the] case would be stronger without 
the Precedents.’65 He was of the idea that an Annex containing only Part I exposed the 
argument to Germany’s reproach of it being mere interference in domestic affairs, and that 
the Precedents provided a safeguard against that argument.66 Verbal altercations ensued 
between Janowsky and Lauterpacht, but both pressed on with their respective agendas.67 
Lauterpacht pressed the idea that the memorandum be sent to Ernst Cohen who – 
surprisingly – supported the whole of it. This supposed a great victory to Janowsky and 
Fagen since this was an idea concocted by Lauterpacht perhaps thinking Cohen would rebuff 
Part II of the memorandum.68 But, unbeknownst to Janowsky at the time was that McDonald 
had already made up his mind: Part II ‘should be left out entirely’, he had told Laski, which is 
confirmed both in an entry to his diary, as well as in a letter to Rosenberg, both dated 24 
November 1935.69 Janowsky continued to defend his memorandum, but by early December 
1935 an understanding of the reasons why his ‘Precedents’ section may be discarded started 
to sink in: McDonald ‘could not disregard the strong opposition taken by the English-Jewish 
leaders against Part II of the Memorandum.’70 
A final conference was held on 8 December. Although the issue remained formally 
open at the end of the meeting, Janowsky rightly read McDonald as having made the decision 
to eliminate Part II.71 On 15 November, the day McDonald and Fagen left London for the US, 
Janowsky met him at Waterloo Station.72 McDonald expressed regret about the fate of Part II, 
which perhaps was only a good gesture towards Janowsky: McDonald’s diary reveals that he 
was ‘pleased’ and that the elimination of Part II was also generally well-received in the US, 
including by Professor Einstein.73 
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McDonald’s Letter of Resignation and its Annex was submitted to the League of 
Nations Secretary General on Friday 27 December 1935.74 On Monday 30 December the 
New York Times featured McDonald’s resignation in its front page under the heading 
‘League Aid Asked by M’Donald to End Nazi Persecution: Commissioner for Refugees, 
Quitting, Asserts 500,000 in Reich Are Being Crushed.’75 Similarly, The Times gave ample 
coverage to the Letter and, besides providing a full transcript, it underlined that ‘[w]ith this 
letter … Mr. McDonald includes an annex running to 34 printed foolscap pages in which he 
analyses the measures adopted by Germany against ‘non-Aryans’ and all their effects in 
creating refugees.’76 
 
C.  THE OVERLAP BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS: UNDERSTANDING 
LAUTERPACHT’S OPPOSITION 
At the time Janowsky believed that Lauterpacht’s position was without merit – and possibly 
grounded in intellectual vanity related to Lauterpacht’s own position in the British system. 
But there may be an alternative explanation in relation to the British academic’s contribution 
to the development of the modern system of human rights less than a decade later: in the 
absence of any treaty or other positive rule of international law, it would be preferable at that 
time to remain silent on any supposed obligation in international law requiring states to 
intervene in favour of the protection of the rights of individuals or minorities.  
Aware of international law’s limitations, Lauterpacht did not yield to pressure to 
support Germany’s treatment of the Jews being referred to the international court in The 
Hague. The idea was ‘inadequate, impracticable and highly dangerous.’ To this, I would add 
that Lauterpacht was also very aware of how important the World Court was – and would 
become in the future – for the protection of the international rule of law, which not only 
relates to interstate dispute settlement, but to the gradual development of international law.77 
Indeed, Lauterpacht was aware that international law, in its state of development at the time, 
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did not prohibit the persecution of minorities – that much was patent from a paper he 
published in 1933 titled ‘The Persecution of the Jews in Germany.’78 
But arguing that certain conduct is not yet prohibited by international law is not the 
same as denying its political and moral importance to the international community as a 
whole. Unaware as Janowsky and Fagen might had been in 1935, their analysis on precedents 
was correct but premature. Only in the aftermath of World War II would those precedents and 
actions occurred before and during the war elicit general international consensus as to their 
forbidden nature as a matter of international law.  
Lauterpacht certainly played an essential role in the process of crystallisation of those 
international duties both through the conceptualisation of ‘crimes against humanity’ in the 
Nuremberg Charter, as well as with his proposal of ‘An International Bill of Rights of Man’, 
much of it reflected later in the Universal Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man and the 
European Convention of Human Rights.79 But in 1935 the issue remained solely in the 
political plane. The Letter of Resignation confirms this when highlighting that, apart from the 
1922 Upper Silesia Convention, Germany is not bound by any international obligation 
‘providing for equal citizenship of racial, religious or linguistic minorities.’80  
Janowsky and Fagen did publish a monograph with Part II of the memorandum two 
years later, in 1937.81 Perhaps the most telling part of the book is its Preface. This section was 
authored by James Brown Scott, then President of the American Society of International Law 
and former President of the Institut de Droit International.82 There, in trying to apprehend 
Janowsky and Fagen’s argument in a positive light, Mr. Brown highlights its consistency 
with human rights declarations issued by the above-mentioned institutions. However, 
nowhere in this preface did this authorised voice in international law-related matters mention 
the existence of customary international rules or treaties supporting the argument of 
Janowsky and Fagen regarding the existence to protect minorities and individuals as set out in 
the draft Letter’s Annex. 
At the time, it is important to remind ourselves, political orthodoxy dictated that 
diplomacy and non-provocation of Germany were the best available options – the 1938 
Treaty of Munich should suffice as evidence on this point. This attitude, more marked in 																																																								
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Europe than America, is reflected throughout Janowsky’s memoirs.83 In the end, the debate 
between the American and British camps was instrumental to the confection of the Letter. 
The differences between both camps regarded means, but not ends, a fact that Janowsky came 
to recognize and appreciate.84 This in no way diminished the extraordinary moral and 
political value of the Letter – quite the contrary, it probably made it an even better document. 
 
D.  CONCLUSION 
As we look from 1935 to the present day, the refugee crisis and the EU-Turkey agreement, 
we can note points of commonality, precedent. Again, we have seen a closing of the door. 
The 2016 vote by Parliament to not allow five hundred unaccompanied children from Calais 
into the United Kingdom says much about the state of public thinking right now, in both the 
UK and abroad. The turning away of refugees who are of an ethnicity or a religion which is 
seen as alien raises direct comparisons with another time. 
It could be that we have arrived at a place in which the time for tinkering, for new 
protocol, for a new institutional structure, is just gone. That actually, the fundamental 
challenge that we face goes much, much deeper, especially in light of a return to identity 
politics. In most countries, the idea of granting nationality is losing ground, and instead we 
can see a return to stripping people of their nationality. At the core of this issue is the 
question of how we should think about the international legal order. We are where we are and 
we have what we have, and the system, as it stands, will not allow for the kind of changes we 
urgently need. 
The truth is that we live in times of increasing disconnect between the legal structures 
that have been built, particularly in the post-war period, and broad public acceptance of those 
structures. You can illustrate this very simply by reference to a small town in north-east 
England, a town which voted en masse against remaining in the European Union. Their 
motivations for voting to leave were tied into the arrival of a significant number of families 
from Poland, or Hungary, or wherever it might be, which had changed the identity of the 
town. In the part of London where I live, I don’t feel that change, but I do feel an increasing 
responsibility to take account of the real perception of people. Something is shifting; the 
disconnect between the legal order we have created and the world that we live in is becoming 
wider, not narrower, and this shift requires us to look at the world, as it currently stands, 
holistically. 																																																								
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Consider, for a moment, the striking fact that my country, the United Kingdom, 
dropped a lot of bombs on Afghanistan and on Iraq, yet doesn’t wish to take a single refugee 
from either of those countries. Germany dropped not a single bomb on Afghanistan or Iraq, 
yet has taken over a million refugees, and it is this disparity that is fuelling a sense of 
disconnect between states – and between people. If we are to grapple with the cold, modern 
issue of refugees, whether in Europe or beyond – and beyond is even more challenging than 
in the European context – we need to begin to start looking at the causes of what is 
happening. We need to look at the nature of the international order and the increasing 
disparities between those who have and those to have not. We need to go beyond simply 
tinkering with arrangements on refugees, beyond even the world of law. You cannot solve a 





All articles published in the UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence are licensed under the Creative Commons 
Attribution License (CC-BY) 4.0 international license agreement and published open access, making them 
immediately and freely available to read and download. The CC-BY license agreement allows authors to retain 
copyright while allowing others to copy, distribute, and make some uses of the work. Further information 
regarding this can be found athttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. 
 
